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STATEMENT THE CASE
1.

NATURE THE CASE

This is a worker's compensation case. Liability under the Idaho Workers Compensation
Act was admitted. In 2008, when Appellant Bryan Oliveros was a high school student between
his junior and senior years, he had a summer job with Respondent Rule Steel Tanks, Inc.,
operating a metal press that shaped pieces of steel. He was injured on July 30, 2008, his second
day of work, when the fingers of his dominant right hand were caught in the metal press,
resulting in a traumatic amputation of portions of all four fingers. Appellant appeals from two
decisions of the Idaho Industrial Commission following separate hearings. The first of the two
decisions on appeal is the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed
November 2, 2012. Regarding that decision, Appellant challenges the determination that he was
not entitled under Idaho Code § 72-432 to medical care in the form of prostheses for his
amputated fingers.
The second decision appealed from is the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order, filed August 25, 2017, and the associated Order on Claimant's Motion for
Reconsideration. Regarding the underlying decision and the decision on reconsideration,
Appellant challenges the determinations that (1) Appellant's permanent partial disability was less
than his permanent impairment of 32% whole person; and (2) that he was not entitled under
Idaho Code§ 72-450 to retraining benefits regarding a pharmacy technician program that he put
successfully put himself through after the Respondent declined to pay for any retraining. At the
time of the second hearing on February 22, 2017, Appellant remained employed by Albertson's
in its corporate offices as a third-party coordinator processing claims for pharmacies when there
was an issue at the point of purchase.
Regarding the retraining determination, Appellant contends the Commission committed
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two errors. First, it erred as a matter of law by failing to apply the correct legal standard in
determining the issue under Idaho Code § 72-450 of whether Appellant, “after the period of
recovery, is receptive to and in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in order to
restore his earning capacity[.]” Second, it committed error by abusing its discretion under Idaho
Code§ 72-450 in determining whether to “authorize or order such retraining[.]” The
Commission essentially concluded that under Idaho Code § 72-450 a young person with no
history of skilled employment is not eligible for retraining, and that “there is no provision for
rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a life-changing accident.”
Regarding the permanent partial disability determination, Appellant contends the
Commission erred by disregarding this Court’s precedent holding that benefits for permanent
partial impairment under Idaho Code § 72-422 are distinct from and not subsumed within
benefits for permanent partial disability under Idaho Code § 72-424. Appellant also contends
that the Commission abused its discretion in arbitrarily rejecting the testimony of Appellant
Oliveros’s vocational rehabilitation expert, Douglas N. Crum, and arbitrarily concluding that
Appellant Oliveros has a “nonmedical” permanent partial disability of 25%. R. 213.
Regarding the determination regarding prostheses, Appellant contends the Commission
committed error by arbitrarily relying upon the testimony of Dr. Gross in the face of evidence
that his testimony was inherently unreliable.
Appellant Oliverosrequests that this Court reverse the Commission’s determination
regarding Appellant’s claim for prosthetic medical care; reverse the Commission’s determination
that he is not entitled to retraining benefits and reverse the Commission’s determination that he
did not sustain permanent partial disability in excess of permanent impairment.
2.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Two hearings were conducted before the Idaho Industrial Commission, one regarding
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claimant’s entitlement to medical benefits in 2012, and one regarding retraining and permanent
disability benefits in 2017. All benefits sought at the hearings were denied.
3.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this case, a high-school student, Appellant Bryan Oliveros, had his fingers chopped off

while performing a summer job. This case once again presents an issue of law upon which this
Court has twice overturned the Idaho Industrial Commission.
(A) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S PRE-RETRAINING WORK HISTORY
As noted by the Commission, on July 30, 2008 Appellant Oliveros was still in high
school when he suffered the traumatic loss of his fingers. R. 4, Vol. 1. At that time, he worked
part-time in a fast food restaurant earning between $7.00 and $7.50 per hour. During his summer
vacation in 2008, he started a temporary summer job at Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., which also
employed his father. There Appellant Oliveros earned seven dollars an hour. On his second day
at work, Appellant Oliveros caught the fingers of his dominant right hand in a metal press
resulting in a traumatic amputation of portions of all four fingers on his dominant hand,
associated crush injuries and some degloving injuries on what remained of his fingers.
Following several surgeries, Appellant Oliveros emerged with a right hand that included an
uninjured thumb and portions of each of his four fingers.
(B) FACTS IN THE RECORD: THE ACCIDENTAL AMPUTATION OF APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S
FINGERS
In 2008, Bryan Oliveros was a high school student whose only work experience was
some part-time work in a fast-food restaurant. During his summer vacation, Appellant Oliveros
started a summer job at Rule Steel Tanks, where his father worked. Mr. Oliveros's job was
operating a metal press that shaped pieces of steel. On Mr. Oliveros's second day of work, July
30, 2008, he caught the fingers of his right hand in the metal press, resulting in a traumatic
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amputation of portions of all four fingers on his dominant hand, associated crush injuries, and
some degloving injuries on what remained of his fingers. R. 131, Vol. 1.
Mr. Oliveros was transported by ambulance to the emergency room where Dominic
Gross, M.D., a hand surgeon, was on call. Dr. Gross performed several surgeries, and Mr.
Oliveros was left with a right hand that includes an uninjured thumb, and portions of each of his
four fingers. R. 131-132, Vol. 1. As a result of the industrial injury to his dominant hand, Mr.
Oliveros has very little grip or capacity for fine dexterity, A. 033, was excluded from all heavyduty work and was severely restricted with respect to all work involving fine motor skills in his
dominant hand. See, generally, A. 273-280.
(C) FACTS IN THE RECORD: PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY AS OF MAXIMUM MEDICAL
IMPROVEMENT
After Appellant Oliveros reached Maximum Medical Improvement from his injury, in an
effort to rebuild his life as best he could, he investigated a number of vocational options. At his
own expense, Bryan retained vocational rehabilitation counselor Douglas Crum and met with
him on September 18, 2009. Mr. Crum concluded that without retraining, Bryan had suffered a
loss of labor market access of approximately 80% and a permanent partial disability of 75%.
See, Vocational Rehabilitation Report of Douglas N. Crum, November 16, 2009, A. 29 - 36.1
Nothing in the record before the Commission contradicted Mr. Crum’s analysis of Bryan’s loss
of labor market access.
(D) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S VOCATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND
REQUEST THE RESPONDENT PAY FOR RETRAINING
In July 2009 Appellant Oliveros was seen by vocational rehabilitation consultant Douglas

Although Claimant submitted to a vocational evaluation by Bill Jorden, an expert of Respondent’ choice, Mr.
Jorden was not called to testify by the Respondent. Thus, Mr. Crum’s opinions regarding loss of labor market
access and permanent partial disability is uncontradicted, unrebutted and unimpeached.
1
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N. Crum C.D.M.S. for evaluation. Mr. Crum produced a report which included medical,
education, and work histories, labor market analysis, and analysis of Appellant Oliveros’s preand post-injury wage-earning capacity and a discussion stating that without retraining Appellant
Oliveros had a permanent partial disability of 75%. A. 029 – A. 035. Mr. Crum’s report noted
that at the time of his evaluation, Appellant Oliveros was attending Nampa High School and
expected to graduate in May 2010. A. 032. Mr. Crum noted:
At the time of the July 30, 2008, industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros was in very good
health, capable of performing medium and heavy physical-demand activities
requiring frequent to continuous use of the bilateral upper extremities for gross and
fine work with his hands. As a result of the industrial injury to his dominant hand,
Mr. Oliveros uses the extremity mostly as a helping hand, as he has very little grip
or capacity for fine dexterity.
A. 033. Mr. Crum concluded that Appellant Oliveros had lost access to 80% of the labor market
that was available to him at the time of his injury. A. 034. Mr. Crum concluded that claimant
needed retraining and that without retraining he had suffered a 75% disability. In reaching this
conclusion, Mr. Crum reasoned as follows:
At the time of the subject injury, Mr. Oliveros was between his junior and senior
years of high school, performing a summer job. Mr. Oliveros’ time-of-injury position
paid $7.00 per hour on a full-time basis. As far as I know, Mr. Oliveros did not
receive any employer-supported benefits.
In my opinion, it does not make sense to use the time of injury wage Mr. Oliveros as
a baseline for a pre and post-injury wage-earning capacity comparison. According to
the US Bureau of the Census, using information from the US Census Department in
2004 the average wage of a high school graduate was approximately $28,763 for
male high school graduates. The average wage for a male worker with a bachelor’s
degree is $50,916.
As a result of the subject industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros will not be able to perform
jobs similar to the work his father performs, i.e. manual laboring positions. He simply
does not have the manual dexterity to do those kinds of jobs.
In my opinion, under the current circumstances, it is appropriate to propose that Mr.
Oliveros be provided with 2 years (104 weeks) of retraining benefits so that he can
either complete an associate degree in a physically compatible career field or use that
as a basis to go on to a higher degree.
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* **
In my opinion, the above retraining program should be considered Mr. Oliveros’ best
means of mitigating the dramatic loss of function of all four fingers on his dominant
right hand. Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros will have a very
difficult time finding and maintaining any sort of good-paying job in his labor
market.
Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros’ would reasonably experience
permanent partial disability, inclusive of impairment, of approximately 75%.
A. 034.
On December 3, 2009, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel provided Respondent’s adjuster with
a copy of Mr. Crum’s report requesting authorization for retraining. A. 037 – A. 38. The surety
declined to authorize any retraining. In the Idaho Industrial Commission’s Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of July 27, 2017, A. 195 – A. 215, it makes no findings
concerning Appellant Oliveros’s December 2009 attempt to obtain retraining.
(E) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S SELF-FUNDED VOCATIONAL
RETRAINING
Left to his own devices, Appellant Oliveros obtained a GED in 2009 after missing too
much school due to his injury to graduate with his classmates. R.199, Vol. 2. Appellant Oliveros
attended Lewis-Clark state college in Lewiston for an academic year. A. 282. Appellant Oliveros
worked briefly after his accident part-time at a local Dairy Queen and for about half a year at a
Verizon call center earning somewhere between $9.50 and $10.50 an hour, however Appellant
Oliveros was unemployed by December 2011. After that, he unsuccessfully sought work at
numerous banks for a teller position, call centers, and for jobs operating machines. R. 199, Vol.
2. Appellant Oliveros decided to retrain himself as a pharmacy technician and completed a
course of study and an internship in May 2013, receiving a Pharmacy Technician certificate.
Appellant Oliveros financed his Pharmacy Technician education with the grant, student loans
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and financial help from his parents. Appellant Oliveros was not employed and did not earn
income during the period of his retraining. R. 199, Vol. 2.
About two months after obtaining his Pharmacy Technician certificate Appellant
Oliveros began work at Terry Riley pharmacy in Nampa as a Pharmacy Technician starting at
$11.80 per hour. Appellant Oliveros worked there for two years. Appellant Oliveros then went
to work at TigerDirect temporarily doing telephone sales making $14.50 per hour. R. 200, Vol. 2.

After applying at numerous pharmacies and banks, Appellant Oliveros worked at
KeyBank from February through September 2016 for $11.50 per hour and was released after a
customer filed a complaint against him relating to a mistake that he had made. R. 200, Vol. 2, A.
242.
In December 2016 claimant found employment at Albertson’s pharmacies corporate
offices in Boise working as a third-party coordinator processing claims for pharmacies when
there was an issue at the point of purchase. There claimant made since $15.87 per hour plus
health, dental, vision, and 401 (K) benefits after three months. There were multiple opportunities
for advancement with Albertson’s. Claimant continued to be employed there at the time of the
February 22, 2017 hearing. R. 200, Vol. 2.
(F) FACTS IN THE RECORD: THE DENIAL OF PROSTHETIC FINGERS FOR OLIVEROS’S
TRAUMATICALLY AMPUTATED FINGERS
Embarrassed by the unsightly appearance of the stumps of his fingers (see, A. 288), in
December 2009, Appellant Oliveros requested that the surety authorize an evaluation of Mr.
Oliveros for prosthetic finger replacements. Correspondence on this topic was carried on
between Mr. Oliveros’s counsel and Pinnacle Risk Management between December 3, 2009, and
November 17, 2010. A. 37-44.

Defense Counsel contacted Dr. Gross who stated that he could
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not recommend partial finger prostheses because they would not improve function. R. 64, 132133, Vol. 1.
Claimant sought an independent expert evaluation from Advanced Arm Dynamics, a
national corporation that specializes only in the prosthetic rehabilitation of individuals with
upper limb absence or loss. Claimant was seen by MacJulian Lang, the Clinical Director of
Advanced Arm Dynamics, a company that specializes in upper extremity prosthetic
rehabilitation. Mr. Lang held a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering from Cornell
University, a certificate degree from Cal State University Dominguez Hills in both prosthetics
and orthotics, had completed two one-year residencies in both prosthetics and orthotics, and was
certified in prosthetics and orthotics by the American Board for Certification. A. 208. Mr. Lang
sent Dr. Gross a detailed report on April 1, 2011, recommending prosthetic fingers which he
indicated would improve grasping and dexterity and provide necessary protection for residual
anatomy. Lang’s report contains photographs which may be helpful to this court in
understanding the nature of Mr. Oliveros’ disfigurement and what the prosthetic fingers looked
like. Mr. Lang’s report makes it clear that the prosthetic fingers would improve function. A. 222.
After stating that he could not prescribe prosthetic fingers because they were not
functional, Dr. Gross had conversations with the Respondent’s representatives and apparently
changed his opinion to a degree. Dr. Gross wrote claimant’s counsel indicating that he would
prescribe the prosthetic fingers if (and only if) Appellant Oliveros settled his case. Dr. Gross
stated that he would “be happy to write for the prostheses should he choose to have them as part
of a settlement in this case.” R. 100, Vol. 1. On November 8, 2011, the Respondent agreed to
pay for prosthetic fingers in the context of the settlement. R. 68, Vol. 1. This offer was declined
by Mr. Oliveros who felt that he was being forced to settle his case prematurely to obtain the
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much-needed prostheses.
Because Dr. Gross had indicated that he would write a prescription for prosthetic fingers
if claimant were willing to settle this case, claimant’s counsel wrote him on December 10, 2011
requesting that since Dr. Gross had committed in a prior letter to writing a prescription for the
prostheses if Claimant settled this case, that Dr. Gross do so immediately so that prescription
could be presented to the surety in connection with the settlement demand and Mr. Oliveros
could seek other sources of funding to obtain the recommended prostheses. A. 373. Dr. Gross
declined to do so. Nevertheless, Dr. Gross testified that he would support Mr. Oliveros’s desire
to obtain prosthetic fingers for cosmetic purposes, “But if you're saying it's a cosmetic thing, I
don't have a problem with it. And if Bryan wants it for cosmetic, I'm okay with that.” Gross
Depo. p. 57 1n. 8-10, A. 358. Dr. Gross and the Respondent Surety were, essentially, forcing
Appellant Oliveros into a position where he would have to settle his case to obtain the partial
finger prostheses. Of course, since the Respondent had denied retraining this would have meant
that AO would have had to drop his claim for that benefit. In his deposition, Dr. Gross admitted
that whether or not claimant got prosthetic fingers as part of a settlement was not of his concern.
His excuse for his conditioning his willingness to write the prescription on Appellant Oliveros’s
settlement of this case was “we were just hopeful that you guys would figure out what you
wanted to do.” A. 361. The logical inference from this testimony is that Dr. Gross was
supporting the Respondent Surety in the effort to see whether or not prosthetic fingers could be
dangled over the head of Appellant Oliveros to get him to settle his case.
(G) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS MITIGATED THE EFFECTS OF HIS
INJURY THROUGH HIS SELF-FUNDED RETRAINING
At the February 22, 2017 hearing, Appellant Oliveros presented evidence that as a result
of his self-funded retraining his permanent partial disability was reduced from 75% to 55%.
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Based upon the evidence presented from vocational rehabilitation expert Douglas Crum,
Appellant Oliveros contended that his disability should be rated at 75% or, if Respondent were
held to be required to reimburse Appellant Oliveros for his self-funded retraining, 55%. The
uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence in the record is that Claimant sustained a 75%
permanent partial disability as a result of the accident in this case, without factoring in mitigation
of that disability resulting from Claimant’s self-financed retraining as a pharmacy technician. A.
279.
Mr. Crum’s testimony and opinions regarding the need for retraining were based upon the
functional capacity evaluation reported by Leah Padaca, ATC-L, Ex. 2 - Crum 4-7-2016 Report
p. 1, A. 281, and Dr. Gross’s restrictions, Ex. 2 - Crum 4-7-2016 Report p. 2, A. 282. At the
hearing and on appeal, Appellant Oliveros contends that the Respondent should not get the
benefit of his retraining program. The uncontradicted vocational expert testimony at the 2017
hearing before the Commission was that Appellant Oliveros had initially sustained a 75%
disability which was reduced to 55% as a result of the retraining program) unless they paid for it.
At the 2017 hearing Douglas Crum testified and both his original vocational report of
November 16, 2009, and his updated report of April 7, 2016, were admitted into evidence. A.
250 – A. 269, A. 273 – A. 280, A. 281 – A.285. Mr. Crum performed an evaluation of Mr.
Oliveros's pre- and post-injury labor market access, using the Boise metropolitan statistical area
labor market. This labor market is comprised of Ada and Canyon Counties. A. 277. Based on
this analysis, considering Mr. Oliveros's pre-injury education, language skills, vocational skills,
work history, and presumed pre-injury capacity for medium to heavy work, it appears that Mr.
Oliveros had access to approximately 7.3% of the jobs in the labor market. Repeating the above
analysis by factoring in the functional limitations caused by amputation of all four fingers of Mr.
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Oliveros's dominant right hand, considering the restrictions given by Dr. Gross, Mr. Crum
concluded that without retraining Mr. Oliveros had access to approximately 1.4% of the jobs in
this labor market. This represented an 80% reduction in labor market access. A. 276 – A. 277.
Mr. Crum testified that in his opinion in Mr. Oliveros’s case, loss of access to the labor
market was based upon his loss of functional capacities due to his impaired dominant hand.
There was no loss of access to the labor market due to an intellectual component because that
remained constant. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 146 l. 2 - l. 24, A. 267. Mr. Crum testified that the
fact that a young person does not have much of a job history does not mean that they do not have
a loss of access to the labor market. Loss of access to the labor market in such a case is based on
the pre-and post-injury physical capacities of the person.
The methodology used in the field of vocational rehabilitation counseling involves some
assumptions normally made to evaluate the loss of access to the labor market. In Mr. Oliveros’s
case, Mr. Crum did look at what Mr. Oliveros’s father had done historically. Had Mr. Oliveros’s
father been a Ph.D. professor or a medical doctor, that might have changed Mr. Crum’s analysis.
2017 Hearing Trans. p. 138 l. 16 - p. 139 l. 18, A. 265. Mr. Crum testified that nevertheless, Mr.
Oliveros’s pre-injury intellectual aspirations are relevant to what he might be retrained in. Mr.
Oliveros might have been able to find a well-paid job in construction or in similar work, but he
was not going to be able to do so after this accident and would need some sort of assistance to
get them back to where he would have the means to go to college. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 93 l.
6 - l. 22, A. 253.
Mr. Crum’s initial report documents the reasons that Claimant required some kind of
retraining, having been excluded from all heavy-duty work by his injury and being severely
restricted with respect to all work involving fine motor skills in his dominant hand. See,
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generally, A. 273-280. Mr. Crum testified that Mr. Oliveros was significantly limited with
respect to the manual work that might have given him substantial pay without retraining. The
functional goal was to move Mr. Oliveros to a job where he would not have to perform manual
labor jobs that required a lot of fine dexterity with his right hand. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 95 l. 9
- p. 96 l. 1, A. 254. In his 2009 vocational evaluation report, Mr. Crum outlined a retraining
program to mitigate Appellant Oliveros’s disability which was proposed to and turned down by
the Respondent:
In my opinion, the only way that Mr. Oliveros will be able to successfully mitigate
the effects of the July 2008 industrial injury is through education. Ideally, Mr.
Oliveros should seek a bachelor’s degree. This would give him a better chance of
being able to earn a good wage in the future. In his current state, it is my opinion
that Mr. Oliveros will probably not be able to find a job in excess of approximately
the federal minimum wage which is currently $7.25 per hour.
In my opinion, under the current circumstances, it is appropriate to propose that Mr.
Oliveros be provided with 2 years (104 weeks) of retraining benefits so that he can
either complete an associate’s degree in a physically compatible career field or use
that as a basis to go on to a higher degree.
A. 278.
Mr. Crum testified that he updated his initial vocational report on April 7, 2016, based
upon additional information showing the outcome of Claimant’s retraining. Mr. Crum felt that
his 2009 projections were vindicated because the retraining at the Milan Institute in pharmacy
technology did result in employment, a significant increase in hourly wages, and a modest
increase in labor market access for Mr. Oliveros. Mr. Oliveros’s retraining allowed him to
develop skills such as customer service, cashiering, and the ability to use a computer more which
further reduced labor market access loss from 80% to 55%. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 98 l. 3 - l.
15, A. 255; 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 102 l. 13 - p. 105 l. 5, A. 256; 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 106 l.
6 - l. 19, A. 257. Mr. Crum testified that it is more probable than not that Mr. Oliveros would not
have restored his wage-earning capacity without his retraining. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 105 l. 23
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- p. 106 l. 5, A. 256 -A. 257.

Appellant Oliveros's retraining program developed transferable skills equipping him to
obtain jobs previously unavailable to him in addition to jobs as a pharmacy technician. Mr.
Crum testified that although Mr. Oliveros obtained specific training as a pharmacy technician,
this only reduced his labor market access loss from 80% to 77%. However, Mr. Crum testified
that if he considers the additional jobs that Mr. Oliveros has access to now because of his
retraining experience in clerical customer-service-type work, his labor market access loss is
reduced to 55%. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 106 l. 20 - p. 108 l. 2, A. 257. Mr. Crum testified that
Mr. Oliveros's training in the pharmacy technology program, which included customer service
training, was helpful in is obtaining his jobs at Tiger Direct and Key Bank. 2017 Hearing Trans.
p. 129 l. 6 - p. 130 l. 12, A. 262 -A. 263.

Appellant Oliveros's pharmacy technician training program was instrumental in allowing
him to obtain his present position with benefits far greater than what he was able to earn at the
time of his injury. At the Milan Institute, Mr. Oliveros learned "Anything that has to do with the
pharmacy world. From different types of drugs, there are classes, generic brand, classifications,
just different things that you can use in the pharmacy world." Respondent's Ex. 2 - Second Depa
ofBryan Oliveros p. 19 l. 23 - p. 20 l. 16, A. 341. Importantly, the body of knowledge that Mr.

Oliveros acquired at the Milan Institute is required to do his job at Albertson's, regardless of
where it might be obtained. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 79 l. 15 - p. 80 l. 12, A. 250. Mr. Crum's
summary of the benefits of Claimant's retraining is set forth at Ex. 2- Crum 4-7-2016 Report p.
2-3, A. 282 -A. 283.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.
ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 72-425 AND
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CONCERNING PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT
AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS
1.1
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in its interpretation of
Idaho Code § 72-425?
1.2
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law by disregarding the
precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court laid down in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157
Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and reiterated in Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho
791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017) concerning the distinction between benefits
recoverable for permanent partial impairment defined by Idaho Code § 72-422 and
benefits recoverable for permanent partial disability defined by Idaho Code § 72-423?
1.3
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in effectively
concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court intended to overrule sub silentio the basis of its
holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) by its
decision in Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738, (2016) and
ignoring the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the basis of its holding in
Corgatelli in its decision in Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d
1261, 1265, (2017)?
2.
ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION’S 2017-2018 ORDERS
REGARDING CLAIMANT’S ENTITLEMENT TO RETRAINING BENEFITS
2.1
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in construing/applying
Idaho Code § 72-450?
2.2
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in failing to give
Idaho Code § 72-450 the liberal construction to which the Claimant is entitled?
2.3
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in concluding that the
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total
temporary disabilities under Idaho code section 72 – 450?
2.4
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in concluding that the
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total
temporary disabilities under Idaho code section 72 – 450?
2.5
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in determining
Appellant Oliveros’s permanent disability based upon a successful retraining program,
while also determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training
program?
2.6
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in determining
Appellant Oliveros’s permanent disability based upon a successful retraining program,
while also determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training
program?
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
-14-

3.
ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION’S 2017-2018 ORDERS
REGARDING CLAIMANT’S ENTITLEMENT TO PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS
3.1
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in construing/applying
Idaho Code § 72-430?
3.2
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in concluding that the
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in
excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid?
4.
ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS 2012 ORDER DENYING
APPELLANT OLIVEROS PARTIAL FINGER PROSTHESES UNDER IDAHO CODE § 72-432.
4.1
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in concluding that the
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to partial finger prostheses as a medical
benefit under § 72-432?
5.
IS APPELLANT OLIVEROS ENTITLED TOATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL UNDER IDAHO
APPELLATE RULE 41?
Appellant Oliveros requests an award of attorney fees on appeal

pursuant to Idaho Appellate

Rule 41 and Idaho Code 72-804. Most recently, this court, citing Hoskins v. Circle A. Constr.,
Inc., 138 Idaho 336, 343, 63 P.3d 462, 469 (2003), has held that an appellant who prevails in part
on appeal is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302,
312, 179 P.3d 265, 275, (2008). However, in Hoskins, there was a cross-appeal on which the
respondent prevailed. Here there is no cross-appeal, because the Idaho Industrial Commission
ruled against AO on every issue. While it makes sense that no attorneys fees should be awarded
in a case in which both parties prevail on some of their issues, a party should not be foreclosed
from being awarded attorney’s fees on appeal when justified simply because only some of his
issues were prevailing. The fact that only some issues were successful on appeal can be taken
into account when determining an appropriate attorney fee award under Idaho Appellate Rule
41(d). In this case, the most important issue is whether or not the Idaho industrial commission is
bound by this court’s prior decisions in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d
1150 (2014) and Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017).
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Because Corgatelli was not followed by the Idaho industrial commission in Davis, this Court had
to hear another appeal construing the relevant statutes contained in Title 72, Chapter 4 of the
Idaho Workers Compensation Act. This Court's opinion in Davis reaffirms the basis of its
holding in Corgatelli in no uncertain terms. The defense bar, and perhaps the Idaho Industrial
Commission, obviously disagree with this Court's reasoning in Corgatelli and Davis.
Nevertheless, to the extent that Respondents oppose Appellant Oliveros's challenge to the Idaho
Industrial Commission's failure to follow Corgatelli and Davis, they do so "without reasonable
ground" which is the standard for an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 72-804.
ARGUMENT
1.

SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

The standard of review in cases appealed from the Industrial Commission is set forth in
Idaho Code § 72-732 provides that this Court overturn a decision of the Industrial Commission
where:
( 1) The Commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent
evidence;
(2) The Commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers;
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud;
(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award.
The standard of review based on Idaho Code § 72-732 has been interpreted by this Court:
When this Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, it exercises free
review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine
whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings.
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion. Because the Commission is the fact finder,
its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. This Court does not weigh the evidence
or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence
presented. Whether a claimant has an impairment and the degree of permanent
disability resulting from an industrial injury are questions of fact.
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Funes v. Aardema Dairy, 150 Idaho 7, 10-11, 244 P.3d 151, 154-155, (2010).
“[A]n arbitrary and capricious act by the Industrial Commission amounts to an abuse of the
Commission's discretion.” Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 34, 137 P.3d 417, 421, (2006) citing
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 691, 864 P.2d 132, 137 (1993). “Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979), defines arbitrary and capricious as the ‘[c]haracterization of a decision or action taken by
an administrative agency or inferior court meaning willful and unreasonable action without
consideration or in disregard of facts or without determining principle.’” Dexter v. Idaho State
Bar Bd. of Comm'rs, 116 Idaho 790, 794, 780 P.2d 112, 116, (1989). An arbitrary action has
been defined as “a refusal to consider the evidence introduced or to make essential findings
without supporting evidence.” Ready-to-Pour v. McCoy, 95 Idaho 510, 516, 511 P.2d 792, 798,
(1973) (dissent) citing Inland Motor Freight v. United States, 36 F.Supp. 885, 887 (D. Idaho
1941).
Arbitrary and capricious action is not simply an abuse of discretion, it is of constitutional
dimension. The Idaho Equal Protection Clause forbids state discrimination that reflects no
rational policy, but which is simply arbitrary and capricious action. Thompson v. Engelking, 96
Idaho 793, 801, 537 P.2d 635, 643, (1975). Quoting Baker v. Carr, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962), stated:
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and
it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but
simply arbitrary and capricious action
Caesar v. Williams, 84 Idaho 254, 266, 371 P.2d 241, 248, (1962).
2.

THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION’S ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF
CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT BENEFITS AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS
Appellant Oliveros’s entitlement to permanent disability was determined as a result of the

February 22, 2017 hearing. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, R.
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195 – R. 215, Vol. 2; order, R. 216 – R. 217, Vol. 2; Order on Claimant’s Motion for
Reconsideration, R. 222-230, Vol. 2. The Idaho Industrial Commission held that Appellant
Oliveros had a “nonmedical” disability of 25% and a medical disability of 32%, but that he could
only be paid for his medical disability. Appellant Oliveros submitted that the nonmedical
disability found by the Idaho Industrial Commission must be paid as an additional benefit to the
medical disability (permanent partial impairment) pursuant to this Court’s holdings in Corgatelli
v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161
Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017). The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation adopted by Order of the Idaho Industrial Commission (R. 216-217, Vol. 2) and
The Order on Claimant’s Motion for Reconsideration contain the following conclusions:
When considering the totality of the evidence, and ignoring for now Claimant's PPI
rating and benefits paid, which will be discussed below, it does not appear Claimant
has suffered a loss of more than 30% of his applicable labor market, and no loss of
earning capacity. Since earning capacity is of minor relevance when compared to
loss of job market, the Referee finds Claimant's non-medical PPD is 25%.
R. 213, Vol. 2. Emphasis supplied.
Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to payment of additional benefits for PPD
not (sic.) in excess of the 32% PPI benefits previously paid under Idaho Code§ 72428.
R. 214, Vol. 2. Emphasis supplied.
Claimant argues he is entitled to PPD benefits even if they do not exceed his
impairment rating and corresponding benefits paid thereunder, citing as authority
Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d (2017). While Davis dealt with
the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce a compensation agreement, ruling that the
Commission lacked jurisdiction to approve the proposed stipulation, the latest word
specifically on the issue at hand is Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007
(March 21, 2017). Dickinson is controlling law on this issue.
R. 213, Vol. 2. Emphasis supplied.
As explained by Dickinson "permanent impairment," is actually only payable as a
component of disability-less-than-total under Idaho Code § 72-428. Impairment is not a
separately owed and payable benefit apart from PPD. Disability paid under the heading of
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"permanent partial impairment" or PPI is included, and credited against any payment
made under PPD. Sometimes PPD will be larger than PPI, since PPD includes those nonmedical factors that impact Claimant's ability to be gainfully employed, and sometimes it
will not. Here PPD is not greater than the PPI rating previously given. Since Claimant has
been paid "impairment," benefits, which are actually disability benefits, of 32% whole
person, a finding of 25% whole person PPD is subsumed within the 32% whole person
benefit previously paid. Claimant is entitled to the larger of the disability components,
which in this case is the PPI payments previously paid.
R . 213-214, Vol. 2. Emphasis supplied.

In its Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, R. 222-230, Vol. 2, the Idaho
Industrial Commission adopted the conclusion of law that these cases had essentially been
overruled or limited by the Idaho Industrial Commission's own decision in Dickinson v. Adams
County, 2017 IIC 0007 (March 21, 2017) which it declared to be "the latest word specifically on

the issue at hand" and "controlling law." R. 213, Vol. 2. On reconsideration, stating that
"Corgatelli cannot not be reconciled with certain language appearing in the subsequent case of
Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho to 23, 370 P,3d 738 (2016). This reasoning conflicts

with the fact that subsequent to this Court's decision in Mayer, and indeed subsequent to the
Idaho Industrial Commission's own decision in Dickinson, this Court issued its opinion in Davis
v. Hammock Management, 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d 1261 (2017). Davis held:

The main thrust of Claimant's argument is that the provision in the Stipulation
granting Employer credit for previously paid PPJ benefits was invalid under this
Court's decision in Corgatelli, that the Corgatelli decision applies here, that the
Commission therefore erred in approving the Stipulation, and that the PPI credit
should either be invalidated or the Stipulation voided. In Corgatelli, the Court
observed: "Examining worker's compensation law as a whole ... this Court finds
that there is no statutory basis for the Commission to award [the employer] a credit
for permanent physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli." Id. at
292, 335 P.3d at 1 I 55. Claimant contends that the Commission erred as a matter
of law in failing to apply Corgatelli to invalidate the credit.
The issue in this case boils down to whether an action by the Industrial Commission
that is not within its statutory authority or jurisdiction can stand. Ifwe were to allow
the Commission to take action that is not encompassed within its statutory
jurisdiction, that would permit it to do what we cannot ourselves do. In Corgatelli.
we stated that "[a]s a purely statutory scheme, the Court cannot judicially construct
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a credit for employers into worker's compensation law." Id. at 292, 335 P.3d at
1155. We held that no provision of the worker's compensation law provides for
such a credit. Id.
Davis, 161 Idaho at 795, 391 P.3d at 1265. Emphasis supplied.
As argued by Appellant Oliveros below:
As Respondent point out, the rulings in Corgatelli and Davis depart from the
interpretation of the statute that defense counsel have followed for years, because
for years lawyers and Commissioners have misinterpreted the statute. No doubt the
Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the relevant statutes is a bitter pill for
defense counsel to swallow. That may even be true for some members of this
Honorable Commission. However, that is not justification for the Idaho Industrial
Commission to fail to follow clear precedent established by the Idaho Supreme
Court.
A. 426.
Whatever the Idaho Industrial Commission may think of this Court’s decision in
Corgatelli and Davis, it is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow them. Indeed, this
Court itself recognizes that obligation:
Stare decisis requires that this Court follow "controlling precedent unless that
precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
overruling that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law
and remedy continued injustice." State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4-5, 343 P.3d 30,
33-34 (2015).
Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 883, 380 P.3d 681, 696, (2016).
If Corgatelli and Davis remain “controlling law,” the Idaho Industrial Commission must
be reversed on this issue and Appellant Oliveros is entitled to be paid for his nonmedical
disability in addition to his permanent impairment benefits.
3.

THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED THE
LAW IN ITS DETERMINATION OF APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S NON-MEDICAL DISABILITY
(A) APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
In reviewing a decision from the Industrial Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court

exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine
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whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P.3d 1238 (2002). Substantial and
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion. Id. Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269,
(2003). Discretionary decisions are reviewed using a three-part test: “(1) whether the
Commission correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
Flowers v. Shenango Screenprinting, Inc., 150 Idaho 295, 297, 246 P.3d 668, 670 (2010)
(quoting Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Commerce and Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162
P.3d 765, 769 (2007)).
(B) PLAINTIFF’S VOCATIONAL EXPERT PROVIDED THE ONLY TESTIMONY CONCERNING
THE EXTENT OF HIS DISABILITY
The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining that Appellant
Oliveros had a “nonmedical disability” of only 25%. This conclusion is not substantial and
competent evidence,” but rather speculation on the part of the Commission. The conclusion was
not reached by an exercise of reason because the Commission dismissed the substantial and
competent evidence of the analysis of Appellant Oliveros’s qualified vocational rehabilitation
expert and then arbitrarily concluded that Appellant Oliveros had a “nonmedical disability” of
only 25% without the support of any reasoning. Even assuming that the Commission’s
reasoning offered to justify its rejection of the conclusions of Mr. Crum meets the criteria for an
exercise of discretion, its conclusion that Appellant Oliveros had a “nonmedical disability” of
only 25% does not.
The Evidence Supporting Appellant Oliveros’s Vocational Rehabilitation Expert’s
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Opinion Was Substantial and Competent
Appellant Oliveros presented evidence from vocational rehabilitation expert Douglas N.
Crum. Facts relating to the evidence presented regarding Mr. Crum’s analysis of the extent of
Appellant Oliveros’s disability, and the need for and effect of his retraining, are set forth above.
See, p. 3 – p. 13 above. Briefly, Appellant Oliveros was a high school student at the time of the
traumatic amputation of his fingers and his only significant job experience was working in a fast
food restaurant cooking and cleaning. He had no management or supervisory experience. A.
277. Appellant Oliveros had also done some landscaping work consisting of mowing grass,
repairing sprinklers, doing some side work, and planting trees. A. 277. Appellant Oliveros
retained vocational rehabilitation expert Crum, who analyzed the medical records and restrictions
given to Appellant Oliveros by Dr. Gross, Appellant Oliveros’s prior work history, Appellant
Oliveros’s access to the labor market both pre-and post-injury and came up with a retraining
plan. Mr. Crum considered the restriction of Dr. Gross to work involving no fine manipulation,
and his impairment rating of 53% of the upper extremity. A. 275.
Mr. Crum also considered the evaluation of Beth Rogers, MD, who noted on June 25,
2009 (approximately 11 months after the accident), that Appellant Oliveros had pain psychology
and stated that he was actively suicidal and had depression.” A. 275. Mr. Crum noted that Mr.
Oliveros had a very disfigured right hand of a kind likely to handicap him in procuring and
holding employment. A. 278. Appellant Oliveros testified that this disfiguration of his hand had
made it three times harder for him to get a job. 2011 Hearing Trans. p. 18 l. 3-7. A. 005.
(Appellant Oliveros testified at the 2011 hearing concerning psychologist Michael McClay,
Ph.D.’s 2008 report stating that Appellant Oliveros is actively suicidal. He testified that he was
concerned about his appearance in the future and employability, that he stopped dating after the
accident for a year or two because his hand “grossed” girls out, and that he noticed that people
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would not engage with him when they saw his disfigured hand. A. 008-009.)
The Respondent Failed To Put On Any Evidence Of Its Vocational Expert’s Opinions,
And The Commission Arbitrarily Determined The Size Of Appellant Oliveros’s Loss Of
Access To The Labor Market In The Absence Of Substantial And Competent Evidence
Rebutting Mr. Crum’s Testimony
As noted by the Commission, “Respondent retained, but did not utilize, a vocational
rehabilitation expert.” R. 207, Vol. 2. Even setting aside the obvious inference that Respondent’s
vocational rehabilitation expert must have found Appellant Oliveros’s permanent disability to
have been at least that found by Mr. Crum (or he would have been called to testify by the
Respondent), the record reflects that Respondent put on no evidence in the form of an expert
opinion as to the extent of Appellant Oliveros’s loss of access to the labor market or permanent
disability.
The Idaho Industrial Commission helped the Respondent out by quibbling with Mr.
Crum’s testimony regarding his conclusions, either by misstating the record, or by engaging in
speculation. Despite having declared that it accepted Mr. Crum’s factual testimony as true, R.
209, the Commission actually rejected most of it. For example, as noted by the Commission,
Mr. Crum testified that at the time of his injury the claimant had access to 7.3% of the jobs in his
labor market in Ada and Canyon Counties, and that post-accident, without retraining the
claimant had access to only 1.4% of the jobs in his labor market. R. 206.

Mr. Crum presented

evidence that this represented an 80% reduction in labor market access. A. 255, 256, 278, 279,
284. This was not an opinion; 80% is what one gets when one divides Appellant Oliveros’s preaccident relevant labor market of 7.3% of the jobs in his labor market by 1.4% of the remaining
jobs in his labor market. From this, and the fact that Appellant Oliveros had no loss of earning
capacity based on his prior minimum-wage job, Mr. Crum concluded in his 2009 report that
Appellant Oliveros had a permanent partial disability of approximately 75%. Mr. Crum’s
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opinion that Appellant Oliveros had a permanent partial disability before retraining of
approximately 75% was an opinion, but his testimony regarding the size of the labor market lost
was a fact cited by the Commission, though it characterized it as an opinion. R. 206. Similarly,
Mr. Crum’s second report states the facts relating to the size of Appellant Oliveros’s postretraining labor market as a matter of fact:
According to the Idaho Department of Labor publication Idaho Occupational
Employment and Wage Survey 2015 there are approximately 607 Pharmacy
Technicians in the labor market. Compared to the general run of occupations that
Mr. Oliveros could have performed on a preinjury basis (7.3% or approximately
20,367 jobs), even adding all of the Pharmacy Technician jobs back into his labor
market[.]
A. 284
There is no evidence in the record as to the size Appellant Oliveros’s relevant labor
market other than the evidence given by Mr. Crum. No motion was made (pursuant to Idaho
Code § 67-5251 or otherwise) by anyone for the Commission to take administrative notice of the
size of any labor market in the case. Mr. Crum’s evidence as to the size of the relevant labor
markets based on statistical information was either evidence of the facts, or there was no
evidence of the size of the labor market for the Commission to base its ultimate conclusion upon:
When considering the totality of the evidence, and ignoring for now Claimant's PPI
rating and benefits paid, which will be discussed below, it does not appear Claimant
has suffered a loss of more than 30% of his applicable labor market, and no loss of
earning capacity. Since earning capacity is of minor relevance when compared to
loss of job market, the Referee finds Claimant's non-medical PPD is 25%.
R. 213.
As the Commission noted in its assessment of claimant’s “nonmedical” PPD, loss of
earning capacity was of minor relevance when compared to a loss of job market. Thus, it is
unclear from where the Commission drew its conclusions that Appellant Oliveros had lost only
30% of his applicable labor market. Either (1) the Commission relied on Mr. Crum’s calculation
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of the size of Appellant Oliveros’s applicable labor market but arbitrarily concluded that
Appellant Oliveros had only lost 30% of that market, or (2) the Commission arbitrarily found
that Appellant Oliveros lost access to 30% of his applicable labor market in the absence of any
evidence of the size of the labor market at all. In either event, it could not have reached its
conclusions as to Appellant Oliveros’s percentages of loss of access to the labor market in
nonmedical PPD through an exercise of reason. The Commissions conclusions regarding the
size of claimant’s lost access to his applicable labor market and the extent of his “nonmedical”
were arbitrary and capricious, arrived at as the result of an abuse of discretion.
(C) THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISAPPLIED IDAHO CODE § 72-450
At the 2017 hearing, Mr. Crum testified that as a result of his accident, Appellant
Oliveros would not be able to do any sort of “higher-payed, manual-labor-type jobs or repetitive
– or jobs requiring repetitive bilateral hand movements.” 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 132 l. 2-15. A.
263. Mr. Crum reported in 2009 that as a result of his injury, Appellant Oliveros would not be
able to perform manual laboring positions, because “He simply does not have the manual
dexterity to do those kinds of jobs. There is no doubt that the severe injuries to Mr. Oliveros’
dominant hand will severely impact his vocational options for the rest of his life. … In my
opinion, the only way that Mr. Oliveros will be able to successfully mitigate the effects of the
July 2008 industrial injury is through education.” A. 278.
Mr. Crum's initial report documents the reasons that Claimant required some kind of
retraining, having been excluded from all heavy-duty work by his injury and being severely
restricted concerning all work involving fine motor skills in his dominant hand. See, generally,
Ex. 1 - Crum 11-18-2009 Report, A. 273-280. Mr. Crum testified that Oliveros was significantly
limited concerning the manual work that might have given him substantial pay without
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retraining. The functional goal was to move Mr. Oliveros to a job where he would not have to
perform manual labor jobs that required a lot of fine dexterity with his right hand. 2017 Hearing
Trans. p. 95 l. 9 -p. 96 l. 1. A. 254.
Mr. Crum recommended a course of retraining for Appellant Oliveros that included going
back to school to get an Associate degree. A. 278. A copy Mr. Crum’s report was sent to Carol
Carr of Pinnacle Risk Management (adjuster for the Respondents) on December 3, 2009, along
with a request for retraining benefits. A. 037. This request was essentially ignored, (see,
Summary of Requests for Authorization Reimbursement for Retraining, 2017 Hearing Exhibit 12.
A. 303.
Appellant Oliveros returned to high school but did not graduate with his class. About
two years after his accident Appellant Oliveros obtained a GED. Financing his own retraining,
in the fall 2010, Appellant Oliveros attended Lewis and Clark State College for two semesters
and one summer semester at a full-time basis taking general business classes. A. 282. In the
spring of 2013, Appellant Oliveros began to study to become a pharmacy technologist, first at
Carrington College in Boise, and then at the Milan Institute in Nampa Idaho where he earned a
significant certificate of completion of pharmacy technology. A. 282. After this education, Mr.
Crum found that as a result of Mr. Oliveros is retraining is labor market access loss had declined
to 55%, A. 284, and his wage-earning capacity had risen to $15.57 per hour based on the average
wage for pharmacy technician. A. 285.
Idaho Code § 72-450 provides:
72-450. RETRAINING. Following a hearing upon a motion of the employer, the
employee, or the Commission, if the Commission deems a permanently disabled
employee, after the period of recovery, is receptive to and in need of retraining in
another field, skill or vocation in order to restore his earning capacity, the
Commission may authorize or order such retraining and during the period of
retraining or any extension thereof, the employer shall continue to pay the disabled
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employee, as a subsistence benefit, temporary total or temporary partial disability
benefits as the case may be. The period of retraining shall be fixed by the
Commission but shall not exceed fifty-two (52) weeks unless the Commission,
following application and hearing, deems it advisable to extend the period of
retraining, in which case the increased period shall not exceed fifty-two (52) weeks.
An employer and employee may mutually agree to a retraining program without
the necessity of a hearing before the Commission.
The Commission misinterpreted Idaho Code § 72-450 by confusing what might be the
fancied aspiration of an eager young worker before an accident, with what is needed to restore
his earning capacity after an accident. Essentially, in the absence of any supporting authority,
the Commission held that if a person dreamed of doing something before an accident he or she
cannot receive retraining benefits to pursue that dream after an accident, even if the evidence
shows that it is necessary.
Appellant Oliveros put on evidence that he was evaluated by Mr. Crum in November
2009 who recommended, based upon his lack of job skills and the restrictions, that he be
retrained. See, generally, A. 277-279. Mr. Crum’s report contains the following:
At the time of the July 30, 2008, industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros was in very good
health, capable of performing medium and heavy physical-demand activities
requiring frequent to continuous use of the bilateral upper extremities for gross and
fine work with his hands.
As a result of the industrial injury to his dominant hand, Mr. Oliveros uses the
extremity mostly as a helping hand, as he has very little grip or capacity for fine
dexterity.
Mr. Oliveros’ prior work history had consisted primarily of part-time jobs while
attending high school. At the time of the subject injury, Mr. Oliveros was between
his junior and senior years. It appears now that he will graduate from high school
in May of 2010 rather than May of 2009. At the time of the injury Mr. Oliveros had
not established a vocational goal other than he had a general interest in obtaining a
business degree or education to become a personal trainer.
Mr. Oliveros is a literate individual and is able to read and write in English and
Spanish. Mr. Oliveros is able to perform basic mathematics. Mr. Oliveros has basic
computer skills. Mr. Oliveros has no history of supervisory experience.
A. 277.
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Mr. Oliveros’ time-of-injury position paid $7.00 per hour on a full-time basis. As
far as I know, Mr. Oliveros did not receive any employer-supported benefits.
According to the Minnesota State Department of Health in a study of census 2000
results, the percent of disabled persons households who lived under the poverty
level was nearly 3 times that of non-disabled populations (15% vs. 6%); average
individual earnings for disabled persons was 22.8% less ($26,978 vs. $34,951). The
percentage of persons with disabilities who are not working was more than twice
as high as individuals with no disabilities. Only 39.4% of people with disabilities
worked full time on a year round basis. The poverty rate for person with disabilities
was noted to be twice as high as the poverty rate for adults without disabilities. The
report goes on to indicate that people with disabilities find it more difficult to
complete post-high school education because they have less earning capacity than
their peers.
There is no doubt that the severe injuries to Mr. Oliveros’ dominant hand will
severely impact his vocational options for the rest of his life.
In my opinion, the only way that Mr. Oliveros will be able to successfully mitigate
the effects of the July 2008 industrial injury is through education. Ideally, Mr.
Oliveros should seek a bachelor’s degree. This would give him a better chance of
being able to earn a good wage in the future. In his current state, it is my opinion
that Mr. Oliveros will probably not be able to find a job in excess of approximately
the federal minimum wage which is currently $7.25 per hour.
A. 278.
In my opinion, under the current circumstances, it is appropriate to propose that Mr.
Oliveros be provided with 2 years (104 weeks) of retraining benefits so that he can
either complete an associate’s degree in a physically compatible career field or use
that as a basis to go on to a higher degree.
In my opinion, the above retraining program should be considered Mr. Oliveros’
best means of mitigating the dramatic loss of function of all four fingers on his
dominant right hand. Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros will
have a very difficult time finding and maintaining any sort of good-paying job in
his labor market. Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros’ would
reasonably experience permanent partial disability, inclusive of impairment, of
approximately 75%.
A. 279.
As stated above, Appellant Oliveros requested that the Respondents fund this retraining
program, Respondents, in not responding, effectively denied that request. A. 303-304.
Unwilling to give up, Appellant Oliveros financed his own retraining program. First, he
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attended Lewis Clark state college for two semesters and one summer semester. Second, he
attended Carrington College in Boise Idaho for about two months was not able to complete the
program because of cost. Third, he completed a program at the Milan Institute in Nampa,
successfully earning a certificate of completion in pharmacy technology. A. 282.
In denying claimant retraining benefits, the Commission reasoned:
1. Claimant did not have an established "field, skill, or vocation" at the time of his
accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries. R. 202.
2. His one-plus day's experience at Rule Steel did not imbue Claimant with skills,
was not his chosen field, and was never considered by him to be a place where he
intended to pursue his vocation. Instead, both pre- and post-accident, Claimant had
aspirations to attend college after high school. Claimant's fulfilled desire of
attending institutions of higher learning after high school hardly fits the common
definition of "retraining into a different field, skill, or vocation." A. 202.
3. The next issue confronting Claimant as regards the language of the statute in
question is the fact that he did not need retraining in order to restore his previous
earning capacity. At the time of his accident, Claimant had a minimum wage
earning capacity. A. 202.
4. Had he not been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further education,
would have likely started his post-high school career at anything other than a low
to minimum wage job. While his further education certainly enhanced his earning
ability, Claimant's earning capacity was not seriously undermined by his industrial
accident, as admitted by Claimant's vocational rehabilitation expert. A. 203.
5. In the present case, Claimant was at a cross roads when confronted with his
postinjury permanent disability and no real work skills. He could have lamented
his condition, maximized his perceived disabilities and focused on what he could
not do. Conversely, Claimant could have resolved to not let his injury define him.
Faced with these alternatives, Claimant chose to discover his capabilities, adapt to
his situation, further his education, and strive to make a life for himself and his new
family. In the process, he incurred substantial educational expenses. A. 203.
6. Respondent should not be required to pay for Claimant's education when it was
not pursued as an alternative to what he would have done but for his injuries.
Respondent' obligation is defined statutorily, not charitably or equitably. A. 204.
7. Claimant's post-secondary education was not directed by his injury. Claimant
had a vision of continuing his education after high school even before his accident.
There is nothing in the record to establish that "but for" the accident, Claimant
would have chosen a different path after high school. A. 204.
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8. Unfortunately, within the parameters of the Act, there is no provision for
rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a lifechanging
accident. To require Respondent to pay for schooling that was part of Claimant's
preinjury planning even without the accident is not proper. A. 204.
In ruling as it did, the Commission misinterpreted Idaho Code § 72-450. First, perhaps
most obviously, there is no requirement under Idaho Code § 72-450 and no legal authority that
anyone, much less a high school junior, “have an established ‘field, skill, or vocation’ at the time
of his accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries.” The implications of
such a rule would appear to be obvious. If such were the case, and unskilled adult worker whose
legs were traumatically amputated while working on a farm would not be eligible for retraining.
Even more obviously, it is the rare case in which a minor child has a “field, skill, or vocation” at
the time of his or her accident. The construction placed on Idaho Code § 72-450 by the
Commission essentially leads to the conclusion that children and those at the beginning of their
working career are not entitled to retraining benefits under Idaho Code § 72-450. This
construction misperceives the condition upon which retraining benefits can be granted, that
being, “if the Commission deems a permanently disabled employee, after the period of recovery,
is receptive to and in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in order to restore his
earning capacity, …” Retraining benefits are available within the discretion of the Commission
if (1) an employee is permanently disabled after recovery (2) is receptive to and in need of
retraining in another field, skill or vocation (3) to restore his earning capacity. Nothing in the
language of the statute requires that the worker have a pre-injury “field, skill or vocation,” unless
“field, skill or vocation” is construed to exclude unskilled labor. Nothing in the language of the
statute would support that construction. Certainly, the Commission has not identified any such
authority other than its own, ipse dixit.

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
-30-

The Commission concluded that Appellant Oliveros was not entitled to retraining
because he had some general aspirations of higher education when he was a junior in high school
that were similar to the retraining recommended as an accident-resultant necessity by a wellestablished certified disability management specialist vocational rehabilitation counselor (see
resume of Douglas N. Crum’s experience includes working as a field consultant for the
Rehabilitation Division of the Idaho Industrial Commission between 1987 and 1984). A. 305306. There is no basis in law or logic for such an interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-450.
The Commission also contends that claimant did not need to be retrained in order to
restore his previous earning capacity. In reaching this condition, the Commission ignores all of
the testimony and reports of Douglas Crum and concludes merely that at the time of the accident
claimant had a minimum wage earning capacity. However, the record shows that while claimant
had essentially only received minimum wage as a high school student, his actual capacity to
perform work without an education was far greater.
Prior to Appellant Oliveros’s retraining, Mr. Crum reported, “At the time of the July 30,
2008 industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros was in very good health, capable of performing medium and
heavy physical-demand activities requiring frequent to continuous use of the bilateral upper
extremities for gross and fine work with his hands.” A. 277. The record contains no evidence to
the contrary. Before Appellant Oliveros’s retraining, Mr. Crum reported,
In my opinion, it does not make sense to use the time of injury wage (sic.) Mr.
Oliveros as a baseline for a pre and post-injury wage-earning capacity comparison.
According to the US Bureau of the Census, using information from the US Census
Department in 2004 the average wage of a high school graduate was approximately
$28,763 for male high school graduates.
A. 278. The record contains no evidence to the contrary. Before retraining, Mr. Crum reported,
“In his current state, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros will probably not be able to find a job in
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excess of approximately the federal minimum wage which is currently $7.25 per hour.” A. 278.
The record contains no evidence to the contrary. Unless this Court is willing to take judicial
notice as a fact of the assertion that an intelligent young man “in very good health, capable of
performing medium and heavy physical-demand activities requiring frequent to continuous use
of the bilateral upper extremities for gross and fine work with his hands” cannot earn more than
minimum wage, there is no reasoned basis for the Commission’s conclusion that Appellant
Oliveros’s preinjury earning capacity was limited to minimum wage.
Indeed, Mr. Crum reported, “According to the US Bureau of the Census, using
information from the US Census Department in 2004 the average wage of a high school graduate
was approximately $28,763 for male high school graduates.” Even using that figure, which is 14
years out of date, assuming an average working year of 2,080 hours the average wage of a male
high school graduate equates to $13.83 an hour. In other words, Appellant Oliveros had the
capacity to earn $13.83 an hour eventually at the time of his injury in his pre-injury condition,
even though he had only earned minimum wage before that. After retraining himself in basic
college courses for year and a summer semester and his Pharmacy Technologist training in 2013,
claimant obtained positions with Medicap Pharmacy in Nampa Idaho at $14 per hour and Terry
Riley clinic in Nampa Idaho at $13 per hour plus100% employer paid health, dental and vision
insurance benefits. A. 285. At the 2017 hearing, Appellant Oliveros testified that he was then
working at Albertson’s corporate office as a third-party coordinator handling issues that
pharmacy techs were having at their pharmacies making $15.87 an hour. 2017 Hearing Trans. p.
17 l. 3 to p. 18. l. 21. A. 299-300. The evidence was clear that Appellant Oliveros needed
retraining to replace his preinjury earning capacity, and that the retraining was effective in
accomplishing that. There was no substantial and competent evidence in the record for the
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Commission to determine otherwise. The Commission simply arbitrarily denied Appellant
Oliveros retraining benefits based upon its misinterpretation of Idaho Code § 72-450.
Again misinterpreting Idaho Code § 72-450, the Commission supported its denial of
retraining by stating, “Had he not been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further
education, would have likely started his post-high school career at anything other than a low to
minimum wage job.” This places an unwarranted gloss upon Idaho Code § 72-450; nothing in
the statute or case law limits the determination of wage earning capacity of a high school student
to the first job that they can obtain upon graduation.
Similarly, the Commission misinterpreted Idaho Code § 72-450 in holding that Claimant
was not entitled to retraining because “[he had a] vision of continuing his education after high
school even before his accident. There is nothing in the record to establish that ‘but for the
accident, Claimant would have chosen a different path after high school.” A. 204. There is
nothing in Idaho Code § 72-450 that disqualifies a person from retraining because he has a
“vision” of bettering himself in any way. Whatever Idaho Code § 72-450 means, it does not
mean “Anyone having a ‘vision’ of bettering him or herself before their accident need not apply
for retraining benefits.”
The Commission’s denial of retraining benefits was based on a misinterpretation of Idaho
Code § 72-450, was arbitrary, and was not reached through an exercise of reason. The
Commission’s decision should be reversed and remanded with instructions consistent with this
Court’s interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-450.

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
-33-

4.

THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANT OLIVERO PARTIAL FINGER PROSTHESES
While he was still a junior in high school

Appellant Oliveros suffered the traumatic amputation of
portions of all four fingers of his dominant hand. (The
picture to the right (see, A. 221) was taken on April 1,
2011 by MacJulian Lang of Advanced Arm Dynamics.)
Following the amputation of his fingers, claimant became embarrassed about his appearance and
stopped dating. His primary problem was that when making new acquaintances, people were
deciding if they even wanted to engage with him because of the appearance of his hand. He was
hopeful that if he could get prosthetic fingers of sufficient cosmetic quality, he could get through
the “icebreaking stage” with people. Appellant Oliveros was diagnosed Dr. Michael McClay,
psychologist, as being actively suicidal. 2011 Hearing Trans., p. 31 l. 6-13 to p. 34 l. 2, A. 008009.
Appellant Oliveros testified at the hearing in 2011 that due to the profound psychological
impact of his disfigurement and its interference with his attempts to find work, Trans, p. 37 l. 1
to p. 38 l.1, A. 10, he sought partial finger prostheses as a medical benefit under Idaho Code §
72-432. (This disfigurement continued to be a problem for Appellant Oliveros in seeking work.
A. 240.) On December 3, 2009, Appellant Oliveros, through counsel, requested that the
Respondent authorize a trial of partial finger prostheses. A. 037. On December 22, 2009, after
Appellant Oliveros’s initial request was not responded to, Claimant, through his counsel, sent a
follow-up request. A. 038. On April 30, 2010, Appellant Oliveros’s Counsel again requested
authorization for consultation with Brownfield's Prosthetics, which, as noted in his letter, had
just completed a multi-finger prostheses authorized by the surety in a worker’s compensation
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case for another client of Seiniger Law with a similar injury. A. 039. Again, there was no
response.
On August 17, 2010, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel again wrote to the surety’s
representative confirming a telephone conversation May 20, 2010, in which the surety’s
representative said that he would contact Brownfield's Prosthetics regarding the evaluation. A.
040. There was no response to this letter. On September 28, 2010, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel
again wrote to Respondent’s representative inquiring into the status of Appellant Oliveros’s
request for partial finger prostheses. A. 41. Finally, on October 11, 2010, the Respondent’s
representative responded by advising that he had contacted Dr. Gross’s office and was told by an
assistant that they did not prescribe prosthetic devices for people “such as Mr. Oliveros.”
Respondent’s representative indicated they had written to Dr. Gross asking whether or not he
would prescribe the partial finger prostheses for Mr. Oliveros. A. 42.
On November 17, 2010, Respondent’s representative sent a letter witha letter from Dr.
Gross dated June 17, 2010 enclosed. However, Respondent’s representative stated that this letter
was in fact not been received until mid-October. A. 043-044. Dr. Gross’s letter simply stated
that he knew of no prosthesis that would improve Mr. Oliveros’s function and that he did not
routinely recommend them “should the patient have functional use of the hand.” A. 044. Given
that Dr. Gross had declined to make a referral upon the basis that the partial finger prostheses
would not add to his hand function, Appellant Oliveros sought out an independent expert
evaluation to determine if Appellant Oliveros might be a candidate for prosthetic rehabilitation.
A. 045. The report, authored by MacJulian Lang, C.P.O., Clinic Dir. of Advanced Arm
Dynamics submitted to the Respondent on June 6, 2011, A. 047, provided a detailed list of
rehabilitation goals, prosthetic requirements, and a prosthetic rehabilitation plan. A. 048-053.
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On August 30, 2011, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel wrote to Dr. Gross regarding
clarification to make sure that Dr. Gross understood that the Idaho Worker’s Compensation act
covered prostheses sought for cosmetic purposes and not just to restore function. A. 055-056.
Appellant Oliveros’s counsel received no response. On November 1, 2011, Appellant Oliveros’s
counsel again wrote Dr. Gross requesting a response to his earlier letter. A. 058.
On November 1, 2011 Dr. Gross wrote to Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stating that any
prosthesis Appellant Oliveros might get would not improve his function, and although they
might be for cosmetic purposes which can be important in a young patient, the patients for whom
he had ordered partial finger prosthesis found them cumbersome, awkward and time-consuming
to use. Nevertheless, Dr. Gross stated that he “will be happy to write for the prosthesis should he
choose to have them as part of a settlement in this case.” A. 061.
On November 8, 2011 Respondent representative wrote to Appellant Oliveros’s counsel
stating that he had spoken with Dr. Gross on several different occasions, that Dr. Gross was
adamant that Oliveros was not in need of the devices nor were they reasonable and necessary.
Nevertheless, the Respondent offered to pay for a “one time shot of these fingers in the context
of a settlement.”

The letter offered no explanation as to how the fingers might be obtained if

Dr. Gross refused to prescribe them. A. 059.
Appellant Oliveros’s counsel again wrote to Dr. Gross on December 10, 2011, quoting
Dr. Gross’s willingness to write the prescription for the partial finger prosthetics as part of a
settlement. Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stated that he inferred that Dr. Gross was not
categorically opposed to prescribing the prostheses, but simply could not advise the Worker’s
Compensation surety that they were medically necessary. Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stated
that given this he requested that Dr. Gross prescribe the prostheses for whatever reason he had in
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mind and agreeing to do so in connection with the settlement of the worker's compensation case.
Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stated that he intended to present it to the surety in connection with
the settlement demand and that Mr. Oliveros could also seek other sources of funding to obtain
the prostheses. Appellant Oliveros’s counsel informed Dr. Gross that even if the surety declined
to pay for the prostheses, Mr. Appellant Oliveros wanted to purchase them if only to mask his
disfigurement for psychological reasons to make him more comfortable in social situations
including job interviews. Appellant Oliveros’s counsel indicated that it appeared that funds
might be available from other sources for the prostheses even if they were only cosmetic, a factor
that remained in dispute. A. 373.
On December 19, 2011, Dr. Gross wrote Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stating that he had
reviewed the request of December 10, 2011. Dr. Gross stated “I have reviewed your request, and
find I am uncomfortable prescribing the prosthesis prior to the settlement being reached. As I stated
earlier, I am happy to write for it should Bryan wish to use his settlement to purchase a set, but I
stand by my original statement that the prosthetic devices are not required for Mr. Oliveros to
improve his functional use of the hand, and do not want my prescription for the prostheses construed
as an agreement to the fact that it is medically necessary.” A. 381. Dr. Gross made his position even
clearer in his deposition testimony when he attempted to claim that multiple prostheses did not make
sense. However, Dr. Gross testified that he had not provided multiple prostheses to his other patients
for whom he had prescribed finger prosthesis, Gross Depo. p. 75 l. 2-13, A. 363, and when asked
whether or not he had any studies to support his testimony concerning the downside of multiple
partial finger prostheses he admitted that he did not know of any such studies. Gross Depo. p. 77 l.
3-23, A. 363.

Dr. Gross’s opinions were belied by his testimony that if it was his child, Dr. Gross
would have supported a trial of the prosthetic fingers:
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Q. Doctor, if you had a child who had these same injuries and that child came to
you and said, "Daddy, I want these just because I want to look better. Kids are
making fun of me at school," would you support that child in trying to get these?
A. Yes.
Gross Depo. p. 56 ln. 11-16, A. 358. Indeed, Dr. Gross testified that he would support Mr.
Oliveros’s desire to obtain prosthetic for fingers for cosmetic purposes, “But if you're saying it's
a cosmetic thing, I don't have a problem with it. And if Bryan wants it for cosmetic, I'm okay
with that.” Gross Depo. p. 57 1n. 8-10, A. 358.
Dr. Gross attacked Mr. Lang somewhat viciously during his post-hearing testimonial
deposition testimony, taken at the instance of Respondent, on spurious grounds having nothing to
do with Mr. Lang’s qualifications. Despite the fact that Mr. Lang had an engineering degree
from Cornell and additional training and residencies in orthotics and prosthetics, Dr. Gross
described Mr. Lang caustically, stating, “The other thing is, is that this gentleman, with all due
respect, is not a hand surgeon and is a salesman, and he's saying these things which are unsubstantiated,
unfounded.” Gross Depo., p. 32 l. 1-4, A. 352. It was evident that Dr. Gross had no basis for

this statement because he testified in his testimonial deposition (taken at the instance of the
Respondent) that he had not reviewed Lang’s deposition, denying that he had received a copy.
Gross Depo, p. 29 .4-18. Exhibit 9 to the deposition of Dr. Gross was a letter from Appellant
Oliveros’s counsel enclosed with which was a copy of Mr. Lang’s deposition provided to Dr.
Gross for his review prior to Dr. Gross’s deposition. A. 376. Dr. Gross went on in his
excoriation of Mr. Lang, to misstate Mr. Lang’s area of specialization (upper extremities) and
justify his complete dismissal of Mr. Lang’s recommendations and deposition testimony
regarding the efficiency of partial finger prostheses, on the basis that Mr. Lang was not a
professional, did not specialize in hands, but also worked on feet (an incorrect assertion as is
obvious by the fact that Mr. Lang is the Clinical Director of “Advanced Arm Dynamics,” a
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company which holds itself out as “specializing in upper extremity prosthetic rehabilitation,” A.
048-0510) and was just a “salesman” because Mr. Lang’s company had allegedly delivered a box
of fruit to Dr. Gross’s office. Gross Depo., p. 32 l. 5 to p. 33 l. 16. A. 352. Dr. Gross’s hubris,
evident in this testimony, and the umbridge that he took at Mr. Lang having the temerity to have
an opinion different than his own, must be read to be appreciated. Before Dr. Gross became
outraged by Mr. Lang’s temerity, or perhaps the process of being cross-examined on his
condemnation of Mr. Lang’s recommendation without his having taken the time to read Lang’s
deposition that was sent to him, Dr. Gross testified that he could not say if the prosthetic devices
recommended by Mr. Lang would impede the function of the hand. Gross Depo., p. 25 l. 1013, A. 350.
By the end of his deposition, Dr. Gross made it clear in his deposition testimony that he
had completely lost any semblance of objectivity on the issue of the prosthetic fingers.
Notwithstanding the report that he had received from Mr. Lang describing the functional value of
prosthetic fingers, Dr. Gross testified “it is absolutely absurd that someone would actually put in
for fingers. And to me, any company that would even suggest that and I will go on the record, is
ridiculous. It is absolutely ridiculous.” Gross Depo. p. 82 l. 14 - p. 83 l. 11, A. 365. These
are the very partial finger prostheses that Dr. Gross testified he would support his daughter in
obtaining if she was in similar circumstances, in which he cheerily offered to write a prescription
for partial finger prostheses if it could be part of the settlement with the Respondent.
Appellant Oliveros moved to take the deposition of Mr. Lang for rebuttal purposes on the
grounds that Dr. Gross said testified to an undisclosed opinion during his post hearing
testimonial deposition that multiple prosthetic fingers such as those sought by the claimant
created problems that single finger prosthesis did not. R. 18-26, Vol. 1. This motion was
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supported by a letter from Mr. Lang indicating that he had knowledge of numerous patients who
would use multiple prostheses for fingers for partial finger amputations on a daily basis. (Since
such prostheses have to be prescribed, this raises at least the inference that other physicians
disagree with Dr. Gross regarding the utility of multiple prostheses.) Despite the justifications
contained in its Order Denying Motion To Take Post-Hearing Rebuttal Deposition, this motion
was arbitrarily denied by the Idaho Industrial Commission. R. 040-043.
In ruling on Appellant Oliveros’s motion to take rebuttal deposition of Mr. Lang, the
Industrial Commission criticized Claimant for not obtaining an “independent evaluation of the
potential efficacy of the prosthesis” if they did not like Dr. Gross' opinion. R. 41. As the record
demonstrates Appellant Oliveros did obtain an independent evaluation of the potential efficacy
of the prostheses and provided Mr. Lang’s deposition as evidence of it. To the extent that the
Idaho Industrial Commission was suggesting that claimant should have sought an independent
evaluation from an orthopedic surgeon, out here in the real world where economic realities figure
greatly into the equation, Claimants in a worker’s compensation case seldom have the money to
obtain an independent medical evaluation to refute an opinion that has never been disclosed prior
to a hearing. It is doubtful that it “advances justice” to penalize them for not doing so. The
Idaho Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously refused to allow a rebuttal deposition to
be taken of Mr. Lang to explore the proposition that multiple partial finger prostheses would
impede the function of Appellant Oliveros’s hand, raised for the first time post-hearing by Dr.
Gross.
The Industrial Commission denied appellant Oliveros’s request for prosthetic fingers,
relying upon Dr. Gross’s testimony stating,
Nothing in the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-432 would prohibit the Commission
from ordering an employer to provide procedures or prosthetic devices that are
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purely cosmetic in purpose. As acknowledged by Respondent, it is well within the
ambit of Idaho Code § 72-432 to require an employer to provide, for example, scar
revision surgery following an industrial bum or a prosthetic eye following an
accident caused loss of an eye. Here, however, we are persuaded by Dr. Gross' s
testimony that the prosthetics in question would not improve; and might actually
impede, Claimant's residual hand function. While we do not doubt that Claimant
would prefer to have a more natural looking hand, this is but one factor we must
consider in determining the reasonableness of Mr. Lang's recommendation. The record
clearly demonstrates that Claimant has thrived since the industrial accident. He has
returned to school and to gainful employment, and in both of these settings he has found
ways to deal with his severe injury, not only in terms of his loss of function, but also
his disfigurement. Dr. Gross convincingly testified that the prostheses are at best
useless, and at worse contribute to an even greater loss of function. We deem these
factors to be more important than whatever cosmetic advantage the prostheses may
offer. For these reason (sic.) we find that the recommendation made by Mr. Lang for
the finger prostheses is not reasonable. Respondent are not obligated to provide the
care recommended by Mr. Lang.
A. 139-140. Emphasis supplied. This finding was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore an

abuse of discretion. “The weight to be given expert testimony depends, among other things, on
the expert's means of knowledge, his competency, extent of experience or study, whether the
witness is biased, the facts upon which his opinion is based, and the integrity of the witness.”
Stroscheim v. Shay, 63 Idaho 360, 362, 120 P.2d 267, 268, (1941). First, the Idaho Industrial
Commission failed to consider, and did not find any facts concerning the obvious conflict
between Dr. Gross stating that he could not recommend prosthetic fingers for functional reasons,
and his multiple statements that he would prescribe them if the claimant were willing to settle
this case. Second, on cross-examination, Dr. Gross testified that he had never prescribed
multiple partial finger prostheses in his practice and was not aware of any articles that discussed
any problems with doing so. Clearly, there was no foundation for Dr. Gross’s testimony on this,
the ultimate issue. Therefore it could not have been substantial and competent. Instead, the
Idaho Industrial Commission impermissibly relied upon speculation and conjecture. Owen v.
Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 448, 599 P.2d 1012, 1019, (1979).
Further, nowhere in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying
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Appellant Oliveros the partial finger prostheses as a medical benefit under Idaho Code § 72-432
is there any analysis of Mr. Lang's extensive testimony regarding the benefits of the partial
finger prostheses. A. 129-141. It is unknown if Idaho Industrial Commission was in lockstep
with Dr. Gross in discounting Mr. Lang's expertise on the grounds that he was a "salesman," but
it does appear that the Commission was mesmerized by Dr. Gross's status as a "hand surgeon"
and completely ignored both Mr. Lang's qualifications and substantial incompetent evidence he
gave of the basis for his recommendations. The decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission in
this regard was an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Appellant Oliveros was a high school student when the fingers of his dominant hand were
traumatically amputated. It is respectfully submitted that the fact that he has been treated harshly
by a system that promises "sure and certain relief' is beyond cavil. That observation, much as it
needs to be made, is not the basis of this appeal. The decision of the Idaho Industrial
Commission is appealed because the Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in
construing Idaho Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-450, and because the Idaho Industrial
Commission abused its discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously finding facts not supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
The Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of Idaho
Code § 72-425 by disregarding the precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court laid down in

Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and reiterated in Davis v.
Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017) concerning the distinction
between benefits recoverable for permanent partial impairment defined by Idaho Code § 72-422
and benefits recoverable for permanent partial disability defined by Idaho Code § 72-423. It
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erred as a matter of law in effectively concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court intended to
overrule sub silentio the basis of its holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335
P.3d 1150 (2014) by its decision in Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738,
(2016) and ignoring the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the basis of its holding in
Corgatelli in its decision in Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265,
(2017). This case should be remanded to the Idaho Industrial Commission with instructions to
enter its amended order requiring the Respondent to pay Appellant Oliveros his nonmedical
permanent partial disability benefits without reduction for the amount of permanent impairment
benefits previously paid.
The Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in construing/applying Idaho
Code § 72-450. The Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in failing to give
Idaho Code § 72-450 the liberal construction required under the Idaho Workers Compensation
Act. The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in concluding that the claimant
failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total temporary
disabilities for retraining under Idaho Code § 72-450 and by determining Appellant Oliveros’s
permanent disability based upon his completion of a successful retraining program, while also
determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training program. The Idaho
Industrial Commission’s decision on retraining was arbitrary and capricious for the reasons set
forth above. The Idaho Industrial Commission’s decision in this regard should be reversed and
remanded with instructions to reconsider the matter without the erroneous construction placed on
Idaho Code § 72-450 discussed above.
The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining Appellant
Oliveros’s permanent disability based upon a successful retraining program, while also
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determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training program. It also
abused its discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously determining that claimant had a loss of no
more than 30% of his applicable labor market in a nonmedical PPD of 25%. These conclusions
were speculative and not based upon any evidence cited in the record. The Commission’s
decision in this regard should be reversed and the issue remanded for determination based upon
the facts set forth in the record.
The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in concluding that the claimant
failed to prove that he was entitled to partial finger prostheses as a medical benefit under § 72430. The Idaho Industrial Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on
speculation in light of Dr. Gross’s admission that he had no basis, clinical or in any studies, for
testifying that multiple partial finger prostheses would impede the function of Appellant
Oliveros’s hand, and, by the Commission’s failure to find facts concerning Dr. Gross’s and the
Respondent Surety’s attempts to force Appellant Oliveros into a position where he would settle
his case. The Idaho Industrial Commission’s decision on this issue should be reversed with
instructions that it find facts concerning the specific recommendations of Dr. Lang’s and the
validity of his reasons for making the recommendations for partial finger prostheses, and that in
view of Dr. Gross’s admitted lack of foundation for his opinion that partial finger prostheses
would not function, that his testimony is to be ignored.
DATED July 18, 2018.

/s/ Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
SEINIGER LAW
Attorneys for the Appellant Oliveros
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On July 18, 2018, I served the foregoing by fax and the iCourt system on:
R. Daniel Bowen
PO Box 1007
Boise ID 83701-1007
Fax: 208-344-9670
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/s/ Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
SEINIGER LAW
Attorneys for Appellant Oliveros
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